Cézanne’s “Primitive” Perspective, or the “View from Everywhere”

Paul Smith

I paint as I see, as I perceive.—Paul Cézanne to Stock, “Le Salon,” 1870

Look, that tree trunk: between us and it there is a space, an atmosphere, I grant you that. But then again it is this palpable, resistant trunk, this body. . . . See like someone who has just been born!—Cézanne to Jules Borély, 1902

I am a primitive, I have a lazy eye. I applied to the École on two occasions, but I don’t make a set piece. A head interests me, and I make it too big.—Cézanne to R. P. Rivière and Jacques Schnier, 1905

Together, these three statements by Paul Cézanne amount to a profoundly counterintuitive account of the relation between the painting and the artist’s perceptual experience. This can even appear paradoxical at first blush, although it is perfectly coherent. The first, to Stock, strongly implies that the artist regarded the painting as the outward sign of what, and how, he saw—very much as Ludwig Wittgenstein was later to characterize “the representation” as the “criterion” of a “visual experience,” by which he meant that it was at once the record, the yardstick, and the public expression of the experience concerned. As such, however, making a painting can also bring aspects of visual experience to light that had previously eluded the artist—just as it is sometimes only by putting our thoughts into words that we know what they are.5 “Painting,” then, was a “means of expressing sensation” for Cézanne not only because it resulted from a “personal way of seeing” but also because it showed him what this was like.6 Cézanne’s insistence in the same statement that he painted as he (broadly) perceived or sensed things and not just (narrowly) saw them, carries the further implication that there was more to seeing than a pure, or straightforward, visual experience as far as he was concerned. Rather, as his remarks to Jules Borély make plain, Cézanne believed that sight brought things close to hand at the same time as it showed how they existed at a distance. His conception of vision is thus closely analogous to the one elaborated much later by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his essay “Cézanne’s Doubt” of 1945 and elsewhere, according to which visual perception has both a “reflective,” or conscious and objectifying, dimension, and a “primordial,” or subliminal, motor-intentional, dimension.7 There is some plausibility, in other words, to the idea that Cézanne held a theory of vision broadly compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s, in which seeing does not reduce to an “objective” account of the “visible,” since it also involves “blind” experiences of an “invisible” corresponding to the “palpation” of objects with “the eye.”8 Equally, it could be said that Cézanne’s theory of perception squares with the “two visual system hypothesis” advanced by A. David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and other psychologists in their wake, which claims that seeing comprises “vision for action” as well as “vision for perception.”9 Cézanne, that is, seems to have anticipated a conception of seeing involving both our conscious experience of the pictures on a “television screen inside our heads” representing the “allocentric” (or objective) spatial relations in a scene and an unconscious, “egocentric” awareness of the muscle movements required for grasping, or broaching, the objects in it.10

This difference between egocentric and allocentric perception is captured perfectly by a distinction Georges Braque made when comparing the space of still life and landscape (respectively): “In tactile space you measure the distance separating you from the object, whereas in visual space you measure the distance separating things from each other.”11 But from what Cézanne said to Borély, it would seem that (unlike Braque) he regarded these two aspects of vision as complementary, or mutually informative, inasmuch as he implied that he saw the tree he mentioned as simultaneously distant and close to hand. In this regard, Cézanne anticipated Merleau-Ponty once again, who argued that “the invisible [is] captured in the visible.” He also anticipated the advocates of a dual visual system, who now acknowledge that “cross talk” between the dorsal and ventral streams in the brain (responsible for vision for action and vision for perception, respectively) permits the unconscious activity of the former to inflect conscious visual experience represented in the latter.12 It is implicit in Cézanne’s use of the word “this” to Borély, more especially, that he believed vision bestowed a tactile immediacy or “thereness” on things, which can be compared to the “proximity” objects assume inside perception according to Merleau-Ponty.13 What is more, Cézanne’s allusion in the same remarks to the corporeality things assume inside acts of vision chimes in with Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the “narcissism” involved by seeing, wherein the world reciprocates the advances of my “fleshy eyes” by implanting a “carnal formula of its presence” in “me” that reflects the embodied character of my interest in it.14 It ought nevertheless to be borne in mind—as Cézanne himself implies—that it is the emerging painting that elicits the perceptual qualities just mentioned, which normally remain unnoticed or subliminal inside everyday, “reflective” perception. In any case, in order for Cézanne’s paintings to serve, or count, as criteria of his visual experience in its fullness, they must—as Merleau-Ponty maintained—somehow give “visible existence to what profane vision thinks is invisible,” and more particularly to “a texture of being” that involves our sense of how seeing unites us with what we see.15 Merleau-Ponty calls this unity “flesh.”16 And although this “invisible” cannot be depicted directly by definition, Cézanne was nonetheless able to make the felt proximity of things at the heart of flesh apparent indirectly, as Richard Shiff has shown, by using emphatic marks to generate spatial and ontological ambiguities that bring all the objects in the pic-
ture almost equally within reach, thereby giving visible shape to what Merleau-Ponty was to call the “chiasm” (or “intertwining”) subtending and merging perceiver and perceived inside embodied seeing.\textsuperscript{17} By extension, subverting the “allocentric” logic of perspective also served to express what Cézanne saw and felt in its totality. Once this is grasped, the irony, and the insight, in the remarks he made to R. F. Rivière and Jacques Schnerb about the mistakes in his drawing become apparent.

Divergent Points of View

Cézanne’s perspective, or, more precisely, his way of projecting space in the painting, can be understood as the vehicle of a form of seeing that Merleau-Ponty describes in *The Phenomenology of Perception*, which he identifies with the subject’s experience of “the view from everywhere” on an object or scene.\textsuperscript{18} In short, the mode of seeing at work in this kind of experience is a complex function of the “abstract” movement internal to prereflective perception that our “phenomenal” or “virtual body” performs in “virtual or human space” by reference to a “body schema” that allows us to gauge our location with respect to the objects of our “anticipated grasp” or the “probing of [the] eye or hand.”\textsuperscript{19} Put more simply, it is a form of vision that corresponds to our habit of rehearsing actions like grasping nearby objects at the same time as we look at them, or walking through larger scenes as we survey them. Crucially, therefore, seeing Cézanne’s paintings as criteria of this kind of visual exploration implies that what critics like Gustave Geffroy termed their “lack of perspective” is not the result of “clumsiness” nor of any “primitive” impulse to make expressive use of “distortion.”\textsuperscript{20} Rather, it strongly suggests that Cézanne’s was what Merleau-Ponty calls a “lived perspective” that registers how the experience of objects unfolds for the perceiving subject. More particularly, it characterizes Cézanne’s perspective as the criterion of a visual experience of “the view from everywhere” on an object or scene.\textsuperscript{21}

The virtue of an explanation of this kind is that it can coherently explain aspects of Cézanne’s work that remain obscure in more traditional art historical accounts that rely on the notion of “multiple viewpoint,” although they address the obvious fact that the objects and scenes in Cézanne’s pictures do not correspond strictly to single views or to the configurations objects project onto the retina or its surrogates.\textsuperscript{22} However, while they identify a semblance of the multiple viewpoint in Cézanne’s works, they do so only spuriously, since they explain this effect as the result of a formalist concern on Cézanne’s part to emphasize the pictorial surface (which directly contradicts his belief that “nature is more depth than surface”).\textsuperscript{23} So, for example, while Fritz Novotny, in *Cézanne und das Ende der wissenschaftlichen Perspektive* of 1938, identifies ostensible shifts of “viewpoint” and “point of view” that disrupt the “perspectival continuum” in Cézanne’s work, he remains noncommittal as to whether or not Cézanne actually changed position while painting, preferring instead to explain these features in formalist terms, as devices that serve to open up “surfaces towards the picture plane” in the interests of “emotional emphasis and associative significance.”\textsuperscript{24} In a similar spirit, although Earle Loran points out in his *Cézanne’s Composition* of 1943 that Cézanne’s works contain “distortions” apparently corresponding to variations in “viewpoint” and use a “universal perspective” permitting a kind of “‘seeing-around’ the object,” he does not go so far as to claim that they actually register views corresponding to different vantage points on the motif. Rather, he takes the fact that the high viewpoints implicit in *The Pigeon Tower at Bellevue* of 1890 (Fig. 1) are impossible from the ground to indicate that Cézanne created the impression of viewing objects “as if from . . . different eye levels”—and, implicitly, the semblance of “seeing around” them—synthetically, in the interests of bringing things “into a better relation with the picture plane,” so they could generate an “emotional, non-realistic illusion of space.”\textsuperscript{25}

In stark contrast, George Heard Hamilton contends, quite unequivocally, in his article “Cézanne, Bergson, and the Image of Time” of 1956, that Cézanne’s “distortions” do indeed articulate “multiple points of view” corresponding to lateral shifts in the painter’s “position.” He argues further that, by virtue of doing so, Cézanne’s works express “cumulative visual experiences recorded at successive but different moments or periods in time,” and thereby give shape to the quality of “continuous becoming” that the world exhibits inside perception according to Henri Bergson.\textsuperscript{26} The problem with Hamilton’s explanation, however, is that there is no hard evidence whatsoever that Cézanne knew Bergson’s ideas, nor any reason at all to think that everything in his work that might look like multiple viewpoint is in fact related to actual movements on his part.

This is not to deny that Hamilton is quite right to mention that Cézanne told his son, in a letter of September 1906, that while he was seated on the banks of the river Arc, “the motifs multiply, the same subject seen from a different angle offers subject for study of the most powerful interest and so varied that I think I could keep busy for months without changing my place, just by leaning at one time more to the right and at another more to the left.”\textsuperscript{27} But even if works such as *The Bridge of Trois-Sautets* of about 1906 (Fig. 2), which probably are related to this letter, as Hamilton implies, exhibit elements that correspond to slightly different views of the same objects, this does not mean they amount to a record of the multiple viewpoints generated by acts of seeing taking place over time. Rather, they are simply sketches recording how the scene looked from slightly different angles, designed to allow Cézanne to plan future paintings.

More generally, any argument to the effect that distortions in the lateral relations between objects correspond to shifts in viewpoint is wholly inconsistent with the important fact, demonstrated by Loran (and several other scholars), that Cézanne painted his motifs from a considerable distance. This is betrayed in many paintings by the way that the scene depicted begins in the middle ground, and by the fact that background objects appear relatively large in comparison to those in the foreground—rather as they do in photographs taken through a telephoto lens.\textsuperscript{28} It makes no sense, in other words, to regard what look like multiple lateral views of objects in Cézanne’s works as signs of actual movement, since the laws of optics dictate that eccentric views of this kind can be
obtained at distances of such magnitude from the motif only by walking a very long way.

The final nail in the coffin of any literal multiple viewpoint argument is that all of Cézanne's remarks on the subject strongly imply that, as far as he was concerned, the motif corresponded to a single view of a scene from a stationary position.29 In a similar vein, Cézanne told Rivière and Schnerb that "the motif" was "a section of nature embraced by the gaze, and isolated by this too, making a whole out of what is a fragment."30 The significance of this conception of the motif is that it is consistent with the advice offered in a book Cézanne owned, Jean-Désiré Régnier's De la lumière et de la couleur chez les grands maîtres anciens of 1865, that the painting should depict "everything one can see without changing position," or "without the gaze changing direction, in a single glance."31 By extension, and contra Hamilton, it
makes sense to think that Cézanne would have concurred with Régnier’s corollary contention that “every time the eye changes its direction it sees another scene,” so that “each look upon a scene constitutes a different painting.” The sole surviving eyewitness report, by Louis le Bail, of Cézanne arranging a still life tells the same story, since he makes it plain that Cézanne took great pains to make sure its elements looked right from one particular viewpoint only.32

Although the phenomenological account of seeing put forward here transcends the limitations of earlier explanations, it must be acknowledged nevertheless that it has almost nothing to say about how it is possible to project a space of the kind it describes onto the two-dimensional surface of a painting—beyond implying that perspective will not do the job since it tends to erase the physicality of perceptual experience.33 To fill this lacuna, therefore, it will be necessary to add to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis by drawing on John Willats’s remarkable demonstration, in his Art and Representation of 1997, of how Cézanne deployed complex and nuanced variants of “parallel” projection systems.34 The particular strength of his thinking on this subject is that while it shows how systems of this kind will produce configurations that *can* be seen to correspond to incommensurate viewpoints, it explains the same configurations much more coherently in terms of their ability to give a sense of the three-dimensional wholeness of objects along with the appearances they present to the static eye.

Taken together, the arguments made by Willats and Merleau-Ponty make it possible to see how Cézanne used projection to represent the complex and ambiguous forms objects assume as a result of the tension between the views they present and how they look for the “incarnate” or “embodied” subject intent on grasping or broaching them in their totality, without resort to any notion of multiple viewpoint as traditionally understood.35 What is more, Willats’s description of Cézanne’s use of several projection systems in the same work, in tandem with devices that serve to render the character of those systems ambiguous, can be extrapolated to explain how his paintings create an elastic space that posits a virtually mobile spectator bent on responding to the visual and visuo-motor information provided by the objects inside it. Willats thus makes possible an account of Cézanne’s work that not only dispenses with the notion of multiple viewpoint altogether but also fills the gap in Merleau-Ponty’s alternative in a way that remains faithful to its spirit.

**Phenomenology Avant la Lettre**

Any claim to the effect that Cézanne’s perspective corresponds in a substantive sense to the “view from everywhere” as elaborated by Merleau-Ponty presupposes an explicit or implicit understanding on the artist’s part of the complexity and fluidity of the relations between subject and object, and sight and touch, inside perceptual experience. Cézanne’s remarks to Borély are evidence of such an understanding, but it is also worth emphasizing that affinities between Cézanne’s thinking and Merleau-Ponty’s can be explained in part by the fact that the philosopher belonged to a continuous *tradition of thinking about perception*, whose exponents include not only Bergson but also Henri Poincaré—and Hippolyte Taine, whose ideas the painter was familiar with.36 More especially, Cézanne’s claims that he painted only his own “sensations” and that he saw in “stains,” along with his declaration that one should “see like someone who has just been born,” all closely paraphrase similar expressions to be found in Taine’s magnum opus, *De l’intelligence* of 1870.37 In all likelihood, therefore, Cézanne’s “personal way of seeing” was the result of a mutually informative to-and-fro between “prior intention,” or ambitions based on Taine’s ideas about seeing, and “intention-in-action,” or realizations arrived at through—and by grace of—the process of painting.38

As Shiff has indicated, Cézanne’s statements about perception suggest he drew two important conclusions from Taine’s writings, both of which anticipate important themes in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking: first, that perception has a stage, prior to its normal or conscious counterpart, that is devoid of any clear sense of a divide between the perceiving subject and the objective world, and second, that inside this form of experience, sight is bound up with a sense of our own potential to touch things.39 What Taine argues with respect to the subject-object divide is that when we experience a “sensation,” which he describes as the “primitive fact” of perceptual experience, this does not involve any clear sense at all that we have a self that is directed toward an object outside it.40 Rather, the “pure sensation” must be understood as the first of two discrete stages of the process of seeing, during which we merely apprehend “variously colored stains” of color as if these were “within us,” just as they are for someone “born blind” who has just recovered sight.41 It is therefore quite unlike our normal experience, in which we “localize” sensations of color on the surface of objects “beyond the constant and delimited surface in which we are enclosed,” after an “interval,” by using our “judgment” without realizing it to identify its “cause.”42 According to Taine, by corollary, someone unable to do this—such as a neonate, or a person born blind who has recently recovered sight, for whom “all the objects he looks at touch his eyes”—can see only “stains” rather than objectified things, and so can have no clear sense of any intentional objects.43 It would seem, therefore, that when Cézanne declared his wish to Borély to “see like someone who has just been born,” he was implying that he wanted to see in a way that relaxed, or even dissolved, the distinction between subject and object.

Taine’s assumptions about neonatal and naive vision underpin his model of the connection between sight and touch. He contends, more particularly, that as infants develop they must learn to localize color sensations on the surfaces of external objects by referring their repeated experience of them to the “tactile and muscular chart,” or proprioceptual map, of their body’s movements that they build up as they habitually reach out toward objects or move toward them.44 Taine continues, however, by asserting that as we develop we learn to correlate visual sensations with the surfaces of objects by reference to a “visual atlas” of our own body, which supplants its predecessor by virtue of being easier to use.45 Our adult vision is therefore much more efficient at localization than the infant’s—but only at the cost of dispensing with “muscular and tactile meaning” that endows infantile seeing with its physicality.46 It is clearly implicit in Cézanne’s declaration to Borély, therefore, that he hoped to refurbish sight with this quality by reengaging touch in its operations.47
It is no surprise, then, that Merleau-Ponty paraphrased this statement of Cézanne’s in his essay “Cézanne’s Doubt” in support of a claim that the artist depicted the world as it appears in “primordial perception,” or that the philosopher cited other statements of the painter’s as reported by Gasquet for the same purposes, including his remarks, “The landscape thinks itself in me” and “I am its consciousness.”

“Lived Perspective”
The particularity of the “lived perspective” in which, according to Merleau-Ponty, Cézanne expressed his perceptual involvement with the world is most readily understood in terms of its ability to give shape to how objects unfold in the twin “settings” of space and time as we actively seek out the meanings they hold for our bodies. Many of the peculiarities of his drawing make sense when grasped, more particularly, as the upshot of an ambition to give shape to “the shifting way” in which “stable things” appear to the actually, or potentially, mobile perceiver. This would suggest that Cézanne’s paintings are disunified precisely because they embody an intention to show the mutability that things exhibit inside prereflective perception, even as they disclose the more constant meanings they hold.

A prime example of a painting that records the interplay between shifting appearances and the stability of things is Portrait of Gustave Geffroy of 1895 (Fig. 4). Here, Merleau-Ponty argues, the table appears to “warp” because its different parts are represented from “the different points of view” that “large surfaces” of this sort present to the “eye” that “runs over” them. At the same time, however, this appearance implies the particular stable shape capable of producing it, and thereby makes this apparent indirectly. Shifting appearances and stability are not two dissociated aspects of perception, in other words, but are two sides of the same perceptual coin.

A related advantage of Cézanne’s lived perspective, Merleau-Ponty proposes, is that it manifests how seeing involves a series of gains and losses as stable objects continually emerge into, and retreat from, perceptual significance. By corollary, Merleau-Ponty maintains, Cézanne rejected “geometric” and “photographic” perspective precisely because it prevented him from expressing what his experience was like, or (as Merleau-Ponty put it in “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”) because perspective succeeds in “coagulating” a series of “monocular views” within a single, fixed, and static viewpoint that renders the “living perceptual field” lifeless. More specifically, because perspective has what Merleau-Ponty describes as the propensity to “crystallize” the “inexhaustible” character of “being” by rendering scenes as if they were “completed for eternity,” Cézanne’s lived perspective implicitly gives shape to the quality of “emergence” the pheno-
nomenal world displays in normal acts of seeing, when we struggle "vainly" to hold its elements together in an "instantaneous synthesis."

Merleau-Ponty gives his most explicit example of how the world does this in "Cézanne’s Doubt," where he details the artist’s tendency to dispense with firm contour lines that fix an object in one place, and to render an edge instead with “several outlines in blue” that capture the “swelling” of the object as this “emerges.” Arguably, this effect finds its way into Cézanne’s lived perspective because it captures the way an edge can appear to vacillate when it is fixated on for a long time. So, too, prolonged fixation may explain several of the “perspectival distortions” that objects in Cézanne’s paintings exhibit when regarded in isolation, as Merleau-Ponty points out. However, the significance of such distortions for Merleau-Ponty, which are “no longer visible” when the painting is “seen globally,” is that they contribute in this wider context—rather like Cézanne’s contours—to the sense of “an emerging order, an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes.” In any event, it remains the case that “distortions” of this kind—including the discontinuous horizontals, splayed-back edges, and (possibly) sloping verticals characteristic of works like Still Life with Apples and Pears of about 1891–92 (Fig. 5)—can do the work they do within Cézanne’s paintings because they are not eliminated by the idealizations of perspective. An analysis of this kind, it must be admitted, could seem anachronistic. Notwithstanding, there is a hint that Cézanne’s work might have embodied ambitions similar to those registered in Jean Richepin’s novel Braves gens of 1886, which not only discusses how “painters were aspiring after a kind of psychological painting, aiming to translate only the impression of things... by means of a synthesis achieved by an initial and primitive drawing” but also has the character Yves de Kergouet—a musician modeled on Cézanne’s close friend Ernest Cabanner—state, “Life is in flux. It becomes... It never just is.”

While emergence can explain some of the disunity produced by Cézanne’s “lived” alternative to perspective, it can also be regarded as a criterion of a related phenomenon: the “rivalry” that objects located in different depths exhibit as a function of constancy, or their ability to retain their size even as they recede into the distance. Cézanne was, in other words, determined to reduce what Novotny called the “size contrast” produced by perspective, or what Guillaume Apollinaire characterized more forcefully as the tendency of the “miserable trick of perspective” to be a “means of making everything shrink.” Cézanne’s own admission that he sometimes rendered things that interested him “too big,” rather than forcing them into a perspectival “set piece,” is also clear evidence that he intended to reinstate this aspect of the “stability” of objects, or to refute the tendency of perspective to impose (in Merleau-Ponty’s words) “a single scale of sizes” on a scene that forces background objects to “resign themselves” to being merely distant.

One explanation of size constancy is that visuomotor perception computes size in “absolute” terms, or in terms of the muscle movements needed to act on an object. Because these values remain constant largely irrespective of changes in distance, an apple, for example, will remain apple-sized as far as the grip is concerned (until far away). This is not to say that Cézanne simply replaced perspectival size with the size of constancy, but rather that he succeeded in representing the interplay between the apparent (allocentric) diminution of objects as they pass into depth and the constant (egocentric) size they retain even as they do so. Cézanne repeatedly represented one phenomenon that Merleau-Ponty describes under this rubric: how a road that recedes into the distance presents sides that are neither simply “convergent” nor yet “parallel,” but “parallel in depth.” This can be seen in The House of Doctor Gachet at Auvers-sur-Oise of 1872–74 (Fig. 6), where the road appears at once to converge and yet to remain the same width along its whole length—in large part as a result of some calculated imprecision on the painter’s part with respect to the contours marking its limits and some careful obfuscation of the color relations in the crucial area where it turns the corner.

As well as retaining their size to some extent as they retreat, objects also retain their true shape to a degree when they are viewed from different positions. One explanation for this form of constancy lies to hand in the work of David Marr, which proposes that we are able to interpret the different silhouettes things exhibit as transformations of stable “object-centered” descriptions, or descriptions of shapes in the round from no particular viewpoint that we can store in our memory. In Merleau-Ponty’s more existential account, shape constancy arises from how things “summon” us to
grasp them in their "maximum richness," or in the fullest significance they can have for us as body subjects. So it is, he maintains, that round-shaped objects in Cézanne's paintings—such as the top of the olive jar and the plate to its right in Still Life with a Chest of Drawers of 1883–87 (Fig. 14)—routinely exhibit a more explicitly objective, circular silhouette than a perspectival view would sanction. Merleau-Ponty does not mean to say, of course, that objects actually look this way in the straightforward sense of the word, since he also remarks that in fixing his "swollen and expanded" ellipses with an "outline," Cézanne renders a meaning objects have within seeing into a definite and objective visual configuration—a reification of experience that "surprises" the spectator.

The View from Everywhere

Although the foregoing account goes some way toward explaining what Merleau-Ponty means by suggesting that things summon us to find their fullest significance, his conception can be fully appreciated only by reference to his notion of abstract, or virtual, movement. The line of thought linking the meaning of objects to virtual movement begins with the observation that we sometimes find it difficult to settle which side of a cube is its "face" because the "sense" (that is, the orientation and the meaning) of such an object is not "natural" (in the sense of inherent or fixed) but one we invest it with—by how we "take a certain hold" of it visually as something having a particular "direction." When we see the front face of a cube as such, in other words, this is not because we grasp the "geometrical relations of equality" among its various angles but because we seize on its various surfaces as having particular orientations, an operation that involves (among other things) placing its faces within a particular sequence in relation to one another. Cézanne arguably captures this aspect of our engagement with things in House in Provence of 1886–90 (Fig. 7) by rendering the orientation of...
Cézanne's "Primitive" Perspective

The ambiguous appearance of the walls of this house can be specified more closely by saying that they look almost as though they are viewed head-on at the same time as they appear inclined with respect to the spectator. One way of explaining this ambiguity is that it corresponds to the appearance an object has when its sides lie obliquely to our line of sight, under which circumstances it will present what Merleau-Ponty terms "an unequal distribution of its influences upon me," and, by doing so, will prompt me to grasp it in its "optimum," "frontal" orientation. Following this line of thought, what Cézanne shows in House in Provence are two inclined walls that the viewer tends to see as frontal as a result of how the artist engages with them. More specifically, since it is implicit in Merleau-Ponty's argument that we can only broach inclined planes of this kind from the front by moving virtually into a position that permits this view, it makes sense to think that Cézanne shows how the walls of this house look when seen by a virtually mobile spectator. So, too, involuntary virtual movement of this kind is what best explains the impression Cézanne creates that receding tabletops tend toward rectangles and that the elliptical tops of bottles and jars are swollen.

This conclusion is also supported by the theory of visuo-motor perception, which explains how objects supply allocentric spatial clues, which, taken together with the egocentric information they present when we move around them, indicate viewpoints that not only reveal how we might best grasp or broach them but also that invite us to adopt them as well. It is no surprise, then, that these scientific ideas also square very closely with Merleau-Ponty's claim that virtual movement enables a "view from everywhere" on a scene by taking the spectator beyond the confines of a single viewpoint and allowing her instead to see every object in it from the position of every other.

Merleau-Ponty begins his detailed account of this kind of experience with the thought that when we concentrate on one particular thing in a scene, we "close up the landscape and open up the object" to the point that we can become "anchored" in it, or "inhabit" it. The advantage of being able to enter an object in this way is that it gives us access to what it can "see." By inhabiting one particular house within a scene, in other words, we come to see aspects of the houses around it that were hidden to us when we occupied a fixed, external viewpoint. The process of disclosure involved in the view from everywhere does not normally stop here, moreover, for even as we concentrate on one particular house, the "horizons" of the houses surrounding it—or those aspects of them that lie at the periphery of our attention—solicit our gaze and beckon to us to seek out the full meanings of the objects they imply. So it is that we readily pass into, and inhabit, these houses, and thereby come to see the house we originally inhabited from the point of view of its neighbors. It then becomes "the house seen from everywhere." In principle, of course, every house in the scene is capable of being seen from the point of view of any other, so they are all potentially visible from everywhere.

The ability to see any object in a real scene from the perspective of any other can sometimes make it difficult to single out one particular object as the most likely to attract our attention. In a painting, though, one object can enjoy special salience because of how the artist has represented it. In Cézanne's The Quartier Four, Auvers-sur-Oise of about 1873...

(Fig. 8), for example, the house that stands proud of its neighbors in the right middle ground is arguably a nodal point of this kind. It is perceptually mobile, nonetheless, because the sense of its walls is rendered ambiguous by devices that thwart any decisive interpretation of their relationships. As with House in Provence, the loose geometry of the walls fudges its shape, a warm-colored roof and a clump of foliage obscure its front lower edges, and a tree hides the leading edge where its two visible walls meet. But what makes this house different from its isolated relative is that it is made perceptually mutable by its relations with its close neighbors. It assumes different guises, in other words, over and above those it presents to a spectator viewing it from outside the scene, which correspond to the views it presents to its neighbors, or to the spectator who inhabits them.

To facilitate a response of this kind, Cézanne very carefully manipulated the relations between the detached house and the houses around it to make these ambiguous, as well as intriguing. Thus, even at first glance, the sense of the house’s gable wall is strongly affected by the inclined side wall immediately to its right, which causes it to appear as if it were itself a slightly inclined plane—perpendicular to its neighbor—that recedes toward the left. This gable wall can nevertheless change its appearance on a more inclusive view, when it can look as though it runs continuously with the low wall to its left as a result of the gestalt effect known as “good continuation.” Our sense of the low wall itself is also affected by the relation into which we bring it with its neighbors. More particularly, it can take on an almost frontal look when seen together with the freestanding gable wall to its left (which appears to be viewed from head-on), but it changes aspect when the combinations into which this wall enters with the walls around it are interrogated. And so on—which is to say that Cézanne makes the sense of almost every wall in the painting irredeemably ambiguous, so that we find ourselves circling the scene, garnering an increasingly complex set of spatial relations as we do so—and without experiencing the least sense that we need move our actual viewpoint.

The spatial incongruity of a work such as Still Life with Apples and Pears (Fig. 5) can seem even more pronounced, but its grosser distortions, such as the bulbous distensions at the top left and lower right of the large red apple at the right of the painting, can also be explained in terms of the view from everywhere available to a stationary artist. More particularly, Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to infer that such visual effects will result from the way that an object on a table of this kind treats its neighbors as “spectators” who guarantee the “permanence” of its “hidden aspects.” Together, in other words, they form a close-knit “system” of relations (or “world”), the organized structure of which allows us to grasp it in its visual totality. Merleau-Ponty thus makes it possible to explain the distortions in Cézanne’s painting in terms of how the objects in it supply the spectator indirectly with the manifold views they disclose to one another (at the same time as they present one view to her directly). Given especially that Cézanne regarded the objects in his still lifes as “gentlemen” who spoke “to one another” and exchanged “confidences,” and that the fruits he painted enjoyed “having their portraits painted,” the idea that he painted how things looked to one another (as well as ourselves) seems more than reasonable.

One feature of Still Life with Apples and Pears is nevertheless difficult to see as corresponding to the appearances things assume as a consequence of virtual movement, namely, the blatant discrepancy between the return in the wall, which is
seen from the left, and the right edge of the table’s right leg (or side?), which is seen from the right. But while this arrangement may not map how things look in a straightforward way that paintings constructed on the principles of allocentric vision would sanction, there is nothing about it that is inconsistent with its being a criterion of a view from everywhere. Rather, the very incongruity of the two warring views serves to force the spectator to keep moving around the scene in search of a resolution to it that will never come—and in the process to gather up a view from everywhere on the whole scene. The divergence of viewpoint between the return and the table makes perceptual sense, in other words, because it works synthetically to create the most adequate corresponding pictorial effect. This implies the more general conclusion that what Cézanne called “the truth in painting” is not a matter of copying objective appearances, but rather of fashioning an object that will do the job of conveying what experience is like, very much as Richepin suggested in Braves gens when he reported the opinions of his protagonists Kergouet and the dramatist Tombre (also known as Marchal, whom he modeled on himself), declaring that:

artistic expression should aim to suggest what cannot of its very nature be translated, and that it should do this by means of signs that are as near as possible to the initial sign of thought. . . . In short . . . the art that is closest to perfection is the one that gives the best illusion of life; and to achieve this aim it is best to seek for the most synthetic means of expression.  

Projection Systems  
As already mentioned, Merleau-Ponty says little or nothing to whom he modeled on himself), declaring that:

Projection can be conveniently defined by reference to a passage Cézanne transcribed (from a manual of some sort) onto the flyleaf of his (recently emerged) copy of Jean-Pierre Thénot’s Les règles de la perspective pratique (Fig. 9), which he bought at the shop of the color merchant Gustave Sennelier. This states:

“Projection” is the representation on a plane surface of an object lying outside that surface into the pattern of marks formed by the straight lines leading from all points of the object as they intersect with this plane surface. Projection is orthographic or geometric when all these lines are parallel. It is central or perspectival when they all converge on the same point.

The more particular value of this transcription is that it shows Cézanne was aware of the two most crucial aspects of projection: that it is a means of transforming the three-dimensional spatial relations in a scene into two-dimensional relations between the elements of the picture surface, and that it comes in two basic forms, parallel and convergent.

As Willats has shown, however, there are many varieties of either basic form, each of which has its own “primary geometry,” or characteristic manner of mapping shape, and consequently its own “secondary geometry,” or characteristic set of two-dimensional structures. The significance of this argument is that, although we intuitively understand the rules that pictures use for transforming their perceptual contents, and thus can readily recover the space they contain, we cannot do so without some loss of content since no single projection system can map all the perceptible features of a scene’s space, merely the particular set it is capable of capturing. The space in any picture can never be a simple analogue of the space we experience in the real world, in other words, only ever what Willats calls a “third domain”—by which he means a space that is neither fully three-dimensional nor yet flat, but which is sui generis.

These arguments can be illustrated by Cézanne’s work, which employs several varieties of parallel projection to produce a “perspective” that Novotný analyzed in terms of its avoidance of “long slanted orthogonals” and “delayed movement of flight lines,” and which Meyer Schapiro described as a “blunted” version of perspective that avoids the “pull” produced by the “convergence” characteristic of this form. Loran, Christopher Gray, Theodore Reff, and Boris Rauschenberg have also made similar observations. But while these scholars’ intuitions go some way toward specifying what makes Cézanne’s picture space distinctive, Willats’s more analytic taxonomy of projection, or “drawing,” systems makes it possible to show that this can be characterized more
tellingly in terms of particular varieties of the parallel systems—even if most of his works only loosely observe their rules.

In the drawing Landscape near Aix-en-Provence of 1877–80 (Fig. 10), for example, Cézanne employs an approximation of horizontal oblique projection, the rules of which stipulate that the front face of an object be drawn parallel to the picture plane as a true shape, and that its visible side face be drawn in the same plane as a true shape also.90 One result of these rules is that the lines indicating the upper and lower extent of the building’s front and side walls run precisely the same course, which can generate the paradox that the surfaces they delimit appear to occupy the same plane even though they are in fact perpendicular. Still Life with Apples and Pears (Fig. 5) uses an approximation of a related system, vertical oblique projection, which bestows a particular look on inclined surfaces that are vertically contiguous, in this case, causing the tabletop to appear to tip up toward the spectator, particularly at the right of the painting, where the line denoting its right edge very nearly continues in the same direction as the line denoting the right edge of the leg beneath it.91 And in House in Provence (Fig. 7), Cézanne employed a loose variant of a third system, oblique projection, which is effectively a synthesis of the first two, and thus generates a space that is something of a compromise between the two kinds of space they produce.92 More particularly, it has a tendency to make both the visible side and upper face of an object swing round into alignment with its front face—rather as the side wall and roof in House in Provence appear with respect to the front, gable, wall.

The thirteenth-century artist Villard de Honnecourt, whom Cézanne admired, used a not wholly dissimilar system informally to project the walls in a drawing of a castle in his sketchbook (Fig. 11).93 We might then conclude that Cézanne was not simply being ironic when he declared himself “a primitive” but that, among other things, he was acknowledging his use of a class of projection systems characteristic of children’s pictures and pre-Renaissance artists. This does not remotely suggest that Cézanne employed parallel projection because it was considered naïve or retardataire, but rather the opposite: that he looked to the “Primitives,” as he told Émile Bernard, because they “look at the present without being bothered by a past.”94 Cézanne used parallel projection, in other words, because its “primitive,” or original and unconventional, character gave it advantages over the academic perspective he abhorred.

One of the most obvious of these is that it renders reasonably convincing views of objects as they look from a “considerable distance,” where the appearance of orthogonal convergence is greatly softened.95 (Willats mentions the table in the painting Still Life with Commode of 1887–88 [Fig. 13], as an example of this capacity.) Parallel projection also has the rather different merit that it can represent shape in its three-dimensional fullness by virtue of an ability to map object-centered descriptions in a relatively undistorted fashion. So although parallel projection comes at a cost, because it does not lend itself to the depiction of complex or intricate shapes, its tendency to generate relatively simple quasi-geometric shapes—such as the stock shapes of drawing manuals, including “the cylinder, the sphere, and the cone” Cézanne mentioned in a letter to Bernard of 1904—gives a picture a strong sense of solid volume.96 This is especially apparent in Woman with a Coffeepot of about 1890–95 (Fig. 12), where Cézanne treats the two halves of the coffeepot in terms of a cone and a cylinder, which are both examples of what Marr calls “generalized cones,” or volumes that are easy to track back to object-centered descriptions because they can be generated by rotating a line about an axis.97 These shapes are also examples of what Irving Biederman calls “geons,” or shapes that will always disclose enough information for their solid volume to be recoverable from any particular view they happen to exhibit.98 Thus, the volumes of the coffeepot are easily inferred from the painting’s surface configuration—as, indeed, are those of the sitter’s upper and lower halves, which are comprised of two not wholly dissimilar joined shapes.

By this account, therefore, parallel projection can simulta-
uneously generate strongly three-dimensional shapes and produce the allocentric spatial relations characteristic of views. These twin abilities explain why, as Willats demonstrates, children deploy parallel projection to preserve the objective shape properties of things even at the later stages of their development when they are beginning their attempts to represent how things appear from a viewpoint. When using these systems children also employ "picture primitives" (or semantic units corresponding to edges in the scene represented) in the form of lines, which can be regarded both as the boundaries of "regions" denoting three-dimensional volumes and as contours corresponding to the edges things present when seen from a particular viewpoint. Cézanne, it would seem, does much the same in his work. In House in Provence, for example, oblique projection used in a variety of ways ensures a reasonably good objective depiction of shape because it draws the sides of the front face of the house to the same length and the house's vertical fleeing edges at "true" lengths relative to each other to form regions of a sort, at the same time that it produces a reasonably persuasive view involving contours.

Parallel projection has one further advantage, which relates to the fact that we have special visuomotor sensitivity to basic shapes such as the cube, cone, and sphere because the percepts on which our motor responses depend are simpler, as well as more ephemeral, than their strictly visual counterparts. Since parallel projection routinely generates shapes of this kind, it follows that it can elicit motor responses more effectively than perspective. Visuomotor shape perception is not wholly unrelated to its visual counterpart, however, since conscious, sighted percepts corresponding to clearly defined allocentric volumes can prime, or help elicit, motor responses. It certainly makes sense to think that Cézanne aimed to capture both aspects of shape at the same time, or to forge a synthesis of the two. And some such ambition would explain why the artist told Sir Gerald Kelly in 1904, "It's very difficult to make apples round"—and why "the dear old man" insisted on talking about "spheres" (and "cones") even when Kelly ventured the opinion that "polyhedral" French apples were "inferior" to their "round" English cousins. It is, in any event, a feature of Cézanne's apples in general that they are free of the particular kind of asymmetrical anamorphic distortion that rigorously applied perspective imposes on round objects when these lie toward the side of the painting—an effect that not only defies constancy (so much so that Charles Blanc and others advised artists to rectify it) but that
also militates against things appearing graspable as a consequence.¹⁰⁵

Unsystematic Projection

It could be objected that Cézanne’s use of parallel projection generates shapes expressing multiple viewpoints. Horizontal oblique projection, for instance, can make a house appear as though it has been viewed from the front and the side; vertical oblique projection can show how a table looks when viewed simultaneously from the front and above; and oblique projection can give the impression that these last two kinds of view have been synthesized. But to see parallel projection in this way is wrongheaded, since the orientation it bestows on surfaces can only look incongruous or imply multiple viewpoints, if it is seen according to the same expectations as those normally applied to linear perspective, a convention Cézanne explicitly repudiated. To regard Cézanne’s paintings as containing views corresponding to multiple viewpoints is thus to commit a category error. By corollary, it makes far better sense to think that Cézanne used varieties of parallel projection without meaning to imply anything at all about actual shifts of physical viewpoint (just as Villard evidently did not) but instead to represent the inflections that virtual movement gives to things, or to show what objects would look like were we to move around them.¹⁰⁶ Parallel projection systems are apt, in other words, to give a sense of the potential of objects for being seen—and grasped or broached—from a multiplicity of positions above and beyond a single external viewpoint.

In order to picture this potential as fully as possible, however, Cézanne played fast and loose with the rules of parallel projection, not only introducing a considerable measure of ambiguity into the system he employed in any single painting but also using more than one system in the same work, and even disguising the fact that he did so. As regards Cézanne’s loose adherence to the rules of particular projection systems, it should be reemphasized that most of his paintings employ what Willats describes as “drawing systems that approximated to the parallel systems” rather than strictly rule-governed examples of those systems.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, it is hard to be sure which variety of projection many paintings actually use because it is unclear, for example, whether or not the front of an object is quite parallel to the picture plane or whether its orthogonals run obliquely or parallel to the edges of its front face. Relations of this kind are especially difficult to settle in House in Provence and The Quartier Four, which are probably best characterized as striking an uneasy compromise between oblique projection proper and its horizontal oblique relative. Insofar as it is unsystematic, projection in Cézanne’s work is not wholly unlike the forms of projection used by children and pre-Renaissance Primitives, which often exhibit a shaky grasp of the rules—either because of incompetence or because their makers had no compelling reason to master them. But while the Primitives combined more than one projection system in the same painting unwittingly, Cézanne did so by design, even if his work may look like theirs.¹⁰⁸ Thus, because Still Life with Apples and Pears (Fig. 5) deploys a precipitous vertical oblique projection to map the right edge of the tabletop and a system more like oblique projection proper for the left side of the same surface that produces a much gentler slope, the tabletop appears to warp. In this regard, it is akin to the parapet in Villard’s drawing of a castle (Fig. 11), which seems to lurch forward vertiginously because it is rendered in vertical oblique (or perhaps axiomatic) projection that jars with the informal oblique (and possibly reverse) projection used for the walls below it and with the orthographic projection the picture employs elsewhere. Yet unlike Villard’s, Cézanne’s use of multiple projection systems is meant to create a continuous, but elastic, space, which can express how things appear to a spectator capable of seizing their changing sense as she moves around them virtually.

Cézanne’s application of loosely defined and multiple projection systems in the same painting went hand in hand with his use of devices that disguise the systems he employed. In House in Provence (Fig. 7), for example, Cézanne chose his viewpoint so that a mound obscures the bottom edges of the building, rather as a low wall hides the lower part of the main building on the right in Landscape near Aix-en-Provence (Fig. 10), or the roof of a building in front hides the lower part of the house standing alone in The Quartier Four (Fig. 8). In all such cases, the effect of introducing elements like this is to mask the vertex that the visible walls of a building form where they meet each other at ground level. Because this is normally characteristic of the system in which the space of the painting is projected, hiding it as Cézanne does makes it very difficult to tell what projection system the painting uses, and hence all but impossible to pin down its space firmly.¹⁰⁹ The introduction of mounds or walls running along the lower part of the houses in the same three works creates additional ambiguity because it can make these buildings look as though they have a “flat bottom,” or that their inclined walls terminate in a continuous horizontal capable of indicating more than one variety of projection (including near oblique and horizontal oblique).¹¹⁰ Indeed, of these three works, it is only Landscape near Aix-en-Provence that unambiguously exhibits a particular projection system—horizontal oblique—and this only because the line denoting the top edge of the low wall runs parallel to the continuous horizontal line denoting the eaves of the house behind it.¹¹¹ It is also plain that placing foliage—strategically—to mask the leading edge of the house in House in Provence and of the freestanding house in The Quartier Four allowed Cézanne to further compound the ambiguity of the projection systems he employed, since this made it possible for him to withhold information about the angles at which the walls are inclined to each other that would normally indicate the workings of a particular system.

In the still lifes and portraits with still lifes in them, Cézanne often produced a related ambiguity by obscuring one or more of the fleeing edges of a tabletop, which enter into characteristic, well-formed relations with each other when drawn according to the rules of particular projection systems. In both Still Life with Apples and Pears and Woman with a Coffeepot (Fig. 12), Cézanne does this by cutting off one edge of the table, which makes it impossible to judge whether its sides run parallel or not. Although the tabletop in both works seems initially to be rendered in vertical oblique projection (which requires both of its sides to run parallel to the vertical edge of the picture), the fact that neither tabletop is unambiguously tilted up quite as much as this system demands...
makes it unclear whether they are projected in a particular fashion at all.

Cézanne's repeated exploitation of devices of these kinds conclusively indicates that he had developed a box of tricks for rendering the character of his projection systematically, but inconspicuously, ambiguous. The skill, even the cunning with which he bent the rules are perhaps at their height in *Still Life with Commode* (Fig. 13) and its counterpart, *Still Life with a Chest of Drawers* (Fig. 14). The former painting is so ambiguous that Willats offered several interpretations of the systems at work in it. In one place in *Art and Representation*, for example, he contends that while the table at the front of the picture is rendered in an embryonic form of vertical oblique projection, the slant exhibited by the "bottom edges" of the commode behind suggests that this object must be projected in another (unspecified) system—despite the fact that its side and front faces are both treated as true shapes, which is usually an indication of horizontal oblique projection. In
some confusion, therefore, Willats concludes that Cézanne “disguised” the projection system in this painting as horizontal oblique. In his later book Making Sense of Children’s Drawings, however, Willats offers a much simpler analysis of the same work, to the effect that the tabletop is treated in a “close approximation” of vertical oblique projection and the commode in horizontal oblique. It probably makes more sense, nonetheless, to think that Cézanne deployed highly informal and elastic versions of all three basic varieties of parallel projection in this work.

This conclusion is supported by a comparison of Still Life with Commode with its sister painting, which, being slightly more thinly and evenly painted, is likely to be the later of the two. This version is also more resolved inasmuch as it subdues the distractingly anomalous spatial relations apparent in the earlier painting by moving the commode to the right, so that the bottom edges of its left side are now completely hidden behind the tabletop. The character of the projection system used in this area is thus entirely ambiguous, even if a horizontal cross strut on the left side of the commode still implies that it is rendered in horizontal oblique projection. More important, the latter painting still contains an obliquely slanted area of darker paint in roughly the same area as the former picture, which plainly cannot represent the lower edges of the commode (as it may have done in the painting at the Fogg Museum) for the simple reason that this has now moved behind the tabletop. The only way to make sense of this peculiar area, therefore, is to assume that it does not represent anything solid at all, or that it is functionally syntactic, as opposed to semantic (like that of a “functional” “constituent” of a sentence). Indeed, it makes sense of the area in both paintings to think that its role is to intervene in the syntactic system of the whole work in such a way as to play down any sense of incongruity arising from their employment of several projection systems.

It would appear that Cézanne expended considerable effort on disguise because it allowed him to introduce a high degree of elasticity into his pictorial space with minimal incongruity. Disguise made it possible for him, in other words, to create a space that is not frozen but instead is responsive to the probing eye, without producing conspicuously anomalous anomalies of the kind that can make a picture look comical, like Villard’s castle, or uncanny, like the spaces in Giorgio de Chirico’s early paintings. And by giving his pictorial space an elusive flexibility, Cézanne could convincingly render the shifting appearances that stable objects assume within embodied perception and, more particularly, inside the view from everywhere.

In the last analysis, Cézanne’s style gave expression to a personal way of seeing that endowed things with substantiality. Not only was this quality absent from much contemporary painting in favor of the operations of perspective, but, more important, it was on the wane in ordinary experience as a result of the rise of spectacle as the normative form of visual experience in its full physicality. And to this extent, or when it succeeds in doing so, Cézanne’s achievement is precisely the opposite of the artistic “suicide” that Merleau-Ponty declares the artist committed by “aiming for reality while denying himself the means to attain it.”

Paul Smith is Professor of History of Art at the University of Warwick. He has published extensively on nineteenth-century French painting and aesthetic theory and is presently engaged on a study of pictorial meaning [Department of History of Art, Millburn House, University of Warwick, U.K., Paul.G.Smith@warwick.ac.uk].

Notes
I am indebted to Laura Hutchinson for greatly enhancing my understanding of many of the arguments referred to in this article and to Jason Gaiger for his generous and perspicacious remarks on an earlier version of the present text. I would also like to thank my two anonymous peer reviewers for their incisive and constructive criticism of the first manuscript of this article. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.


25. See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 67-68.

23. Cézanne to Émile Bernard, April 1904, in Cézanne, Correspondance, 166, for a letter to Zola of April 1870 in which Cézanne describes “a stunning motif” offered by the Mont Ste-Victoire at one (and only one) specific point during the railway journey from Aix to Marseilles. In a letter of May 1885 to Zola from L’Estaque, a village near Marseilles, Cézanne told his friend, “I have some beautiful viewpoints here, which do not quite amount to motifs,” which clearly equates the motif with a single, unchanging view (ibid., 211). And about 1900, Cézanne told Joachim Gasquet, while out walking with him, “This old path is a Roman road. The Roman roads were always admirably situated. . . . They had a sense of the landscape. At every point they make a painting.” Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne (Paris: Fernh Heneu-Jeanne, 1921), 86.

23. See Cézanne, Correspondance, 165, for a letter to Zola of April 1878 in which Cézanne describes “a stunning motif” offered by the Mont Ste-Victoire at one (and only one) specific point during the railway journey from Aix to Marseilles. In a letter of May 1885 to Zola from L’Estaque, a village near Marseilles, Cézanne told his friend, “I have some beautiful viewpoints here, which do not quite amount to motifs,” which clearly equates the motif with a single, unchanging view (ibid., 211). And about 1900, Cézanne told Joachim Gasquet, while out walking with him, “This old path is a Roman road. The Roman roads were always admirably situated. . . . They had a sense of the landscape. At every point they make a painting.” Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 304.


31. Régnier, De la lumière, 53-54. For the evidence that Cézanne owned a copy of Régnier, see Ralcliffe, “Cézanne’s Working Methods, 166; and Jean de Beucken, Un portrait de Cézanne (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 304.


33. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” in Johnson, Aesthetics Reader, 76-120, esp. 86-87.


40. Taine, De l’intelligence, vol. 1, 190. See also Shiff, Cézanne, 19.
41. Taine, De l'intelligence, vol. 2, 90, 94, 120.
42. See ibid., vol. 2, 74–75, 88, 91, 95. I have retained the term "localize" (for situer) from the 1872 translation of Taine’s text by T. D. Haye, On Intelligence (New York: Holt and Williams, 1872).
43. Taine, De l'intelligence, vol. 2, 112.
44. Ibid., 106; see also 104–8, 121.
45. Ibid., 156.
47. Ibid., 136-40.
48. Ibid., 106; see also 104-8, 121.
49. See Millar and Goodale, The Visual Brain, 165–64, 168–69; and Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, 180–82.
50. For another discussion of this point, see Rauschenberg, “Perceptual Perspective,” 28–29.
51. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 253, 263–64.
52. See Novotny, “Scientific Perspective,” 382–84, on how the “vagueness” of Cézanne’s “contour” produces a “retardation of movement” in his perspective and results in “a decrease in perceptual exactness and clarity.
54. See Millar and Goodale, The Visual Brain, esp. 147, 164–69, 180–90; and Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, esp. 127–31. For discussions of the relevance of ideas about “flow” deriving from J. J. Gibson to this aspect of visuomotor perception, see Millar and Goodale, 50; Bruce et al., Visual Perception, 302–11; Jacob and Jeannerod, 180–82; and Sean Dorrance Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty,” in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 102, 109–10 n. 43. See also Millar, Space and Sense, 116, for empirical evidence that confirms this argument.
55. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 68; and idem, “Indirect Language,” 87.
56. See Kelly, “Seeing Things,” 74–110, esp. 85–87 and 95–98, for the argument that we can best understand what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that objects can see one another by analogy with his claim that we can get a firmer grip on the actual color of an object by moving our eyes around a scene, which reveals how the particular color appearance it has at any moment deviates from the norm it would exemplify under ideal conditions. We can therefore get a better sense of the shape of an object (than we can from any one particular viewpoint) by adopting the positions of its neighbors, who “see” in this only specific, metaphoric sense.
57. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 68; and idem, “Indirect Language,” 87.
59. In this respect, the notion of the view from everywhere closely anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about flesh insofar as it implies that we experience depth not as a localized feature of isolated objects but as a “global locality” present to me at every point because I am caught up in the fabric of a world constituted by “bonds,” or in a web of “relationships . . . woven . . . between it and me as incarnate subject.” Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” 111–19.
60. See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 68.
62. See Kelly, “Seeing Things,” 74–110, esp. 85–87 and 95–98, for the argument that we can best understand what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that objects can see one another by analogy with his claim that we can get a firmer grip on the actual color of an object by moving our eyes around a scene, which reveals how the particular color appearance it has at any moment deviates from the norm it would exemplify under ideal conditions. We can therefore get a better sense of the shape of an object (than we can from any one particular viewpoint) by adopting the positions of its neighbors, who “see” in this only specific, metaphoric sense.
63. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 68.
64. See Bruce et al., Visual Perception, 159; and Timothy J. Clark, The Sight of Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 54, for a discussion of related effects in the painting of Nicolas Poussin.
65. In this respect, the notion of the view from everywhere closely anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about flesh insofar as it implies that we experience depth not as a localized feature of isolated objects but as a “global locality” present to me at every point because I am caught up in the fabric of a world constituted by “bonds,” or in a web of “relationships . . . woven . . . between it and me as incarnate subject.” Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” 111–19.
of the Monkey," *Journal of Neuropsychology* 78, no. 4 (October 1997): 2226–30, esp. 2227. I am grateful to Laura Hutchinson for this reference.


104. See Derek Hudson, *For Love of Painting: The Life of Sir Gerald Kelly*, K.C.V.O., P.R.A. (London: Peter Davies, 1975), 19. Here Kelly states that Cézanne "obviously" used "compasses" to incise the contours of his apples, although there is no evidence that he did.

105. See Gray, "Cézanne’s Use of Perspective," 63.

106. To see multiple viewpoints in Cézanne’s paintings is thus tantamount to seeing them as identical in intention to those recent works by David Hockney that superimpose photographs taken from different viewpoints in an attempt to capture the shifting allocentric views registered by the moving eye.


109. In horizontal oblique projection, this vertex would be a T junction (with the bar of the T at the bottom), and in oblique projection, it would be a Y junction (with the stem of the Y turned back between the forks of the V, or what is also known as an arrow junction). See Willats, *Art and Representation*, 15–16, for a detailed taxonomy of the three main types of vertex. For a related discussion of how eliminating vertices from drawings can make deciphering shapes all but impossible, see Irving Biederman, "Recognition-by-Components: A Theory of Human Image Understanding." *Psychological Review* 94, no. 2 (1987): 115–47.


111. See Novotny, "Scientific Perspective," 387, for a (mistaken) discussion of how Cézanne aligns two inclined surfaces to form "a continuous horizontal" in *The Basin at the Jas de Bouffan*, ca. 1876.


113. Ibid., 48.


115. I was unable to study these paintings in the original, so I am grateful to Louise Orsini, then at the Fogg Art Museum, for allowing me to consult the magnified images of high-resolution scans that she made of them.

116. For a discussion, see Smith, "Pictorial Grammar," 582.

117. The same area also further unifies the pictorial space of both paintings by softening the transitions between solid objects located at different depths, and thus functions in like areas of "passage" (in, for example, the left edges of the apples to the right of center in *Still Life with Apples and Pears*) that play down the abruptness of the transitions produced by occlusion, irrespective of any perceptual origin they might ultimately have in the vacillation of fixated edges. For a discussion of Cézanne’s "passage" in terms of "lost edges" that draws on André Lhote, see Loron, *Cézanne’s Composition*, 102, also 32–33, 65, 115, 130. On pictorial syntax, see Smith, "Pictorial Grammar," esp. 573–79.


120. For a discussion, see Smith, introduction to Roux, *The Sub stance*, 1–45.

121. Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne’s Doubt," 63, which attributes this thought to Bernard, perhaps because of the latter’s argument in "Une conversation avec Cézanne," 95, that Cézanne’s "research . . . seemed restricted by the most peculiar and unexpected obstacles. Was not my old master determined on suicide?"