

Kant Study Guide IV

The Schematism and Analogies

Readings: Transcendental Logic of Principles: A136/B175-A158/B197 (pp. 78-88),
A176/B218-A194/B239 (pp. 100-111)

Gardner: *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*
(pp. 165-179) [on ELECTRONIC RESERVE]

Be sure to use the Gardner to guide you in this reading.

The Schematism (A136/B175-A158/B197 (pp. 78-88))

1. What are schemata, and why does Kant need this idea, exactly? What is the difference between a schema and an imagined image?
2. Why are transcendental schemata associated with time? (Recall that there are only two forms of representation, intuition and conception. And note, further, that whereas space is characteristic of some experience, time is characteristic of all experience, both sensible and conceptual.)
3. What is the relationship between the pure logical concept of substance and the experience of permanence? What is the relationship between the pure logical concept of causality and a succession in experience in accordance with a rule?
4. Why, according to Gardner, do we face a vexing choice regarding our understanding of schemata? I.e., why must we choose whether schemata are primarily either conceptual or intuitive, and why is this a problem, for Kant?

The Analogies (A176/B218-A194/B239 (pp. 100-111))

- In this section, Kant continues his discussion of certain a priori ideas that characterize the empirical world of our experience. These ideas, or **categories** of thought, are basic elements of empirical thought: i.e., they form the foundation of the empirical world as conceived by us. The concepts of substance and of causality are two such ideas or categories, on Kant's view.
- An **appearance** is an extra-mental object of human sensation. A **percept** or **perception**, on the other hand, is a mental state (i.e., lies within the head). (Unfortunately, Kant sometimes uses 'appearance' to refer to a mere percept.)
- The **manifold** of appearances, referred to by Kant, is that complex of images fed to the conscious mind by the senses. Part of the mind's task is to organize this complex into something intelligible. Note that the complexity is both temporal (different images come at different times) and non-temporal (different images come at the same time).
- When Kant speaks of a **rule** or an event occurring **in accordance with a rule**, he is referring to the idea that the event must **necessarily** occur. I.e., he is referring to what we experience as causal necessity.
- Kant uses the term '**subjective**' to refer to mental states and the term '**objective**' to refer to the extra-mental object of experience.

Central Question: What role does the concept of causality play in experience?

Subsidiary Questions:

1. When I “see a house,” what do I really see? Do I, e.g., see something in three dimensions? Do I see the back and the front, together? Does it make much difference whether I see first one side and then the other, as far as my overall cognition of the house is concerned? What role in thinking of what I see as a *house* is played by the mind, and what played by the senses? (A191/B236)
2. What must the mind think, in order to think that an event has occurred? (A192/B237)
3. What is the difference between thinking that an event has occurred, on the one hand, and thinking that one is seeing the different sides of a house? (A192-193/B237-238)
4. Why does Kant say that the order of his perceptions of the ship is “determinate” (i.e., irreversible)? In what sense can the successive percepts not be reversed? What is the result of imagining them to be reversed? (A192-193/B237-238)
5. How do we know that what we experience as a caused event is a feature of the objective, empirical order, and not simply a feature of our subjective apprehension of that order? (A192/B238)
6. What does Kant mean when he says that an event is “conditioned by a rule.” (A194/B239)
7. What, then, is the difference, as we experience them, between an *event* (occurrence) and an *object* (of the material sort), according to Kant? What role does the concept of cause play in distinguishing these two possible objects of experience? (A193-194/B238-239)
8. Why is it that, for Kant, every event must have a cause?